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Prior to the 2000 planting season, some industry obsemers predicted acreage of 
genetically modified crops would decline dramatically. However, actual 2000 plant- 
ings presented a puzzle. Farmers reduced their acreage of genetically modified corn, 
but concurrently increased their  acreage of  genetically modified  soybeans. We 
demonstrate that it may be theoretically optimal for risk-averse farmers to reduce 
their corn acreage but not their soybean acreage. However, past experience, atti- 
tudes, and farm size explained planting decisions to a larger degree than did risk 
preferences. 
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Introduction 
The introduction of  genetically modified (GM) crops in 1996 was heralded as a new era 
of  agriculture; farmers would benefit from lower production costs, higher yields, and 
reduced pesticide use. From the beginning, Europe and Japan expressed misgivings 
about food that had been genetically manipulated, and refused to import transgenic 
grain. The European and Japanese consumer controversy over GM crops intensified in 
late 1999 and early 2000. Anticipating  the possibility this negative reaction would spark 
consumer concerns in the United States,  several  American companies,  including Gerber, 
Frito-Lay, and Heinz, announced they would discontinue  use of  GM ingredients in their 
products. Consequently, agricultural producers entering the 2000 crop year faced in- 
creased uncertainty regarding the demand for these crops. 
Prior to the 2000 planting season, some industry observers predicted GM acreage 
would decline dramatically. However, actual 2000 plantings presented a puzzle. Farmers 
reduced their acreage in GM corn, but concurrently increased their acreage in GM 
soybeans. Our objective is to analyze  the determinants of spring  2000 planting decisions, 
and evaluate the importance of  demand uncertainty for GM crops as a decision factor. 
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We model the demand uncertainty as  an  uncertain price penalty for GM crops. A theoret- 
ical model of the acreage allocation decision for a risk-averse producer is paired with 
producers' assessments of the relative production risks and returns of GM and conven- 
tional crops. These assessments were elicited using focus groups. Testable hypotheses 
are  obtained regarding the effects of the GM controversy, and then are  tested using data 
from a spring 2000 survey of Iowa producers. 
Theoretical Model 
A producer's acreage allocation decision is modeled using expected utility maximization 
for a risk-averse producer choosing between a GM  and a conventional variety. The 
producer faces yield risks for GM and conventional products. Due to the  controversy, the 
producer faces a further risk for the GM crop in addition to price risk. In comparing the 
GM and conventional varieties, we focus on the additional risk associated with the GM 
alternative, since both the GM and conventional crops face the same underlying price 
risk associated with commodity crops. In  order to emphasize the GM-conventional  variety 
choice, the allocation decision is examined within a specific  commodity rather than across 
commodities. Including commodity price risk responses and the cross-commodity  acreage 
allocation decision would complicate the analysis substantially without providing addi- 
tional insight into the questions we emphasize. 
The decision to model risk-averse  producers is based on findings of previous economic 
research as  well as  producer comments elicited through focus  group discussions. Several 
empirical studies  have established that producer risk aversion is an  important factor in 
acreage allocation decisions using producer-level data. Results of a study conducted by 
Mama and Carlson suggest the intensity of adoption could be explained by differences 
in farmer attitudes toward risk and the covariance of enterprise returns. Saha, Shum- 
way, and Talpaz jointly estimated production function and utility function parameters 
and determined that Kansas wheat farmers exhibited risk-averse preferences. In  review- 
ing the agricultural economics literature on risk aversion, Moschini and Hennessy note 
that producers typically exhibit some degree of  risk aversion, and most frequently 
decreasing absolute  risk aversion, and increasing relative risk aversion. More generally, 
Binswanger used experimental methods to identify individuals' risk preferences, and 
found his subjects' preferences were consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
Three focus groups were conducted in cooperation with the Iowa Farm Bureau Feder- 
ation.'  During the focus group discussions, producers' concerns were elicited about 
marketing GM crops, as  well as  their evaluation of the production characteristics. Price 
risk was the common factor across their three primary concerns, even though we did not 
explicitly ask about the possibility of a price dis~ount.~  First, producers were concerned 
there would be an actual price penalty on GM crops. Second, they expressed concern 
that elevators would not accept GM crops for the  first few months following the  harvest. 
Farmers with operating loans may incur substantial interest payments if they wait to 
'  For each county, the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation county agent provided us a list of names of progressive farmers who 
tended to be informed about technological breakthroughs and informed about current events. We then recruited the farmers 
from this list who had experience with GM crops. Three focus group sessions were conducted-two  groups in  Mason City in 
north-central Iowa, and one in  Albia in south-central Iowa, with a total of 21 participants. 
Of course, the effect of this  risk on returns and utility depends on government program  which may protect participants 
from price variance. We are indebted to Dan Sumner for this observation. 582  December 2003  Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 
sell their crop, resulting in an effective price discount. Third, they were concerned that 
elevators would never accept GM crops, although most focus group participants thought 
this scenario was very unlikely to occur. As noted by some participants, an additional 
indirect price discount would result if producers are required to segregate their GM 
crops. 
Of course, producer risk aversion is not the only potential explanation for producer 
behavior. Various types of  heterogeneity could be used to explain producers' acreage 
allocation decisions regarding GM varieties. For instance, corn planted early in the 
season and corn in southern Iowa are more susceptible to damage from the European 
corn borer (ECB)  than corn planted mid-season and corn in  northern Iowa, respectively. 
Alternatively, producers vary in their ability to grow crops, and some GM crops are easier 
to produce than conventional varieties. Land heterogeneity could explain acreage 
allocations based on average yield differences due to soil quality or susceptibility to 
weed problems. Variables are included in our empirical model to address these and 
other potential explanations for acreage allocation decisions. Due to the nature of pro- 
ducer concerns, however, specific focus is on price and production risk in our theoretical 
model. 
A general model of  a producer's decision is used to allocate acreage among conven- 
tional varieties and GM varieties for any crop, based on the model of a risk-averse firm 
developed by Sandmo, and developed for acreage allocation decisions by Just and Zil- 
berman (1983, 1984). The model closely follows the logic of Just and Zilberman (1983), 
although our comparative statics  focus on different variables, so our derivations are not 
presented here. Pis  defined as  the output price, PI as  the land price, and the crop yields 
as Y,-(E,  where i = c for the conventional crop, and i = grn for the GM crop. Pest 
control costs are separated from other production costs because GM input traits affect 
the producer's pest control options. Certain production costs are denoted by Ci, pest 
control costs are denoted by Zi-(&, uii),  and acreage is denoted by A,. An  uncertain 
output price penalty is included for GM  crops, d-(d, a:),  0  d > P,  to illustrate one 
potential impact of the GM controversy. Wealth is decomposed into total land value and 
net returns, where land value is denoted by plA, with Pl defined as  the  per acre price of 
land, and A is the total acreage in the crop. Wealth is defined as 
The producer allocates acreage between the GM crop and the conventional crop in order 
to maximize the expected utility of end-of-period  wealth (EU[W, U' [W > 0, U" [W < 0): 
max EU[P,A + (PY, - C,  - Zc)Ac  + ((P  -  - Cgm -  zgm)~gm] 
Ac Jgm 
For purposes of illustration, we assume that the crop yields and pest control costs 
of the conventional crop and GM crop are  independent: cov(Ygm,  Y,)  = 0, cov(Zgm,  2,)  = 0, 
cov(Ygm,  Zgm)  = 0, and cov(Y,, 2,) = 0. The price discount on GM crops is assumed to be 
independent of the individual producer's GM crop yield, or cov(d, Ygm)  = 0. 
To solve for the interior solution, we assume complete land utilization, A,  +Agm  =A. 
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In order to solve this first-order condition,  we take a first-order Taylor series expansion 
of  UYW)  = Ut(W)  + u"(w) [W -  evaluated at  expected end-of-period wealth, W.  After 
substitutingfor Ut(W)  and W, dividingby u'(w), and taking expectations, we obtain the 
following: 
where 
ER,  = (PE - C,  -  Z,), 
As defined, $ is the coefficient of  absolute risk aversion evaluated at expected end-of- 
period wealth, W. 
INTERIOR  SOLUTION.  If the producer plants both crops, then acreage is allocated 
according to the following rules: 
and 
(3) 
ER, -  ER,,  + @A  var(gm) 
A,  = 
@(var(c>  + var(gm>) 
ERgm  -  ER,  + @Avar(c) 
Agm  = 
@(var(c>  + var(gm>)  ' 
When the producer plants both crops, the optimal acreage allocation is based on two 
components: first, the ratio of the difference in the expected returns of  the conventional 
and GM  crop, and the total variance, weighted by the farmer's risk preferences; and 
second, the percentage of  the total variance attributed to the alternative crop. The acre- 
age in the conventional (GM) crop will increase as the expected returns for the conven- 
tional (GM)  crop increase relative to the expected returns for the GM (conventional)  crop 
and as the variance of  the GM  (conventional)  crop increases relative to the variance of 
the conventional (GM) crop. 
Table 1  reports the comparative static results for the interior solution to the producer's 
utility maximization problem. The predictions are largely the same as those for the 
standard two-crop allocation problem, although we emphasize pest control cost varia- 
bility and relative price variability. The producer will allocate less acreage to a crop if 
there is an increase in its expected pest control costs, and in the variance of either yield 
or pest control costs. When the expected yield of the conventional crop increases, the 584  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Comparative Statics for the Producer's Acreage Allocation Decision 
GM  Crop  Conventional Crop 
Variable  a*)  (4) 
Price (P)  ?  ? 
Discount (d)  -  + 
Variance of discount (a:)  -  + 
Expected yield of GM crop (Y,)  ?  ? 
Expected yield of conventional crop (Yc)  -  + 
Expected pest control costs for GM crop (2,)  -  + 
Expected pest control costs for conventional crop (Zc)  +  - 
Yield variance for GM crop (a,m)  -  + 
Yield variance for conventional crop ($)  +  - 
Variance of pest control costs for GM crop (aim)  -  + 
Variance of pest control costs for conventional crop (a;=)  +  - 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion (4)  ?  ? 
Table 2. Producers' Subjective Views on Mean and Variance of GM Crop Yields 
and Total Costs per Bushel Relative to Conventional Varieties (C),  Based on 
Production and Cost Characteristics 
Description 
Roundup Ready  Bt Corn  Roundup Ready  Liberty Link 
Soybeans (RR)  (Bt)  Corn (RR,c)  Corn (LL) 
Expected yield  Ym < YC  YE,  > Fc  Ym,$  = Yc  yu  = Fc 
Production costs  cm>  cc  c~t>  cc  CRR,  > cc  cu>cc 
Pest control costs  Z,  <  ZC  4,=0,  $>o  ZLR,~<ZC  Zu  < zC 
Expected total costhushel  ETC,  <  ETCc  ETCBt  >  ETCc  <- - depends on weed pressure -  -  > 
Yield variance  var(Y,)  <var(Yc)  var(YBt)<var(Yc) ~ar(Ym,)<~ar(yc)  ~ar(yu)<var(yc) 
Variance of pest control costs  var(Z,)<var(Zc)  var(ZBt)  = 0  ~ar(Zm,~)<var(Zc)  var(Zu)<var(Zc) 
var(Zc)  > 0 
Variance of total costhushel  var(TC,)<var(TC,)  V~TCB~)<V~TCC)  var(TC,,,)<var(TCc) vd%)<vd%) 
producer will allocate more acreage to the conventional crop. In contrast, due to the 
price uncertainty associated with the GM crop, the sign is ambiguous for the  producer's 
acreage allocation for both the GM crop and the conventional crop when the expected 
yield increases for the GM crop. If there is a certain price discount, so that a:  = 0, then 
the producer would increase the acreage allocated to the GM crop when the expected 
yield of the GM crop increased. 
A more risk-averse producer will be more sensitive to changes in the  variance of total 
profit attributable to each crop, and will make larger changes to his acreage allocations 
than a less risk-averse producer. The producer will increase (decrease) acreage in the 
GM crop if the variance in profits attributable to the conventional (GM) crop increases 
relative to the variance in profits attributable to the GM  (conventional) crop. If the 
relative shares  of the  profit variance of each crop are  unchanged by the GM controversy, 
the producer will not change his acreage allocation. Alexander, Femandez-Comejo, and Goodhue  Farmers' GM Acreage Allocation Decisions  585 
The theoretical model is  paired with focus group findings related to producer concerns 
about price risk, and producers' evaluation of the production risks and returns associ- 
ated with planting GM crops relative to conventional crops (summarized in table 2). 
Following the  focus group finding that  producers perceived an  increase in the price risk 
for GM crops between the 1999 and 2000 crop years due to the GM controversy, we offer 
two testable hypotheses for producers at an interior solution in 1999. Acceptance of 
these hypotheses would imply that the uncertain price effects of the GM controversy 
dominated any offsetting production considerations. First, an  increase in the expected 
price penalty or the  variance of the price penalty results in an acreage increase for the 
conventional crop and an acreage decrease for the GM crop. 
TESTABLEHYPOTHESIS  1 (TH1).  Forproducers whoplanted both GM and conven- 
tional seed in 1999, the share of  acres in GM seed will &crease  in 2000, ceteris 
paribus. 
The alternative  hypothesis for the  theoretical model is  that  production considerations 
outweighed price risk. If, as  indicated by the focus groups, GM soybeans offer substantial 
production benefits, we would expect TH1  to be rejected for GM soybeans. Its  acceptance 
or rejection for GM corn will depend on the relative importance of GM corn's lower cost 
variance, higher average cost per bushel, the expected price discount, and the variance 
of the price discount. More broadly, an alternative hypothesis outside the model is that 
factors other than risk and risk attitudes determine planting decisions. For instance, 
constraints on labor or on managerial effort may be driving acreage allocation decisions. 
For an  interior solution, both the direction and the magnitude of the changes in  produ- 
cers' acreage allocations depend on their degree of risk aversion. Assuming the degree of 
the producers' risk aversion is independent of the crops, we offer testable hypothesis 2. 
TESTABLE  HYPOTHESIS  2 (TH2).  A producer's changes in acreage allocations for 
GM corn and GM soybeans in 2000 will be positively correlated. 
CORNER  SOLUTIONS.  The conditions for  the producer to plant a single crop are: 
A.  The producer will plant all acreage in the GM crop if ER,  > ER, + 4A  var(gm). 
B.  The producer  will plant  all acreage in the conventional crop if ER, 2 ER,  + 
4A  var(c). 
C. If the expected return from the conventional (GM) crop is higher than the expected 
return from the GM (conventional) crop, and the variance of  the conventional 
(GM) crop is lower than the variance of  the GM (conventional)  crop, then the 
producer will plant all acreage in the conventional (GM) crop. 
Condition A(B) is met when the expected returns from the GM (conventional) crop 
meet or exceed the expected returns from the conventional (GM) crop and the disutility 
from the risk associated with the GM (conventional) crop. Condition C is met when the 
expected returns from the GM  (conventional) crop stochastically dominate the 
conventional (GM) crop, and identifies when the production characteristics of the GM 
crop will dominate the price risk due to the GM controversy. Returning to producers' 
characterizations of alternative crops summarized in table 2, note these conditions are 586  December 2003  Journal of Agngncultural  and Resource Economics 
more likely to be met for Roundup Ready soybeans than for conventional soybeans. For 
corn, conditions A and B are  more likely to be met for conventional corn than for Bt corn, 
and condition C is unlikely to be relevant. 
While it is more difficult to derive robust testable hypotheses  for those producers who 
were at a corner solution in 1999, we offer the following, admittedly weak, tests. If a 
producer allocated all acreage to the conventional crop in 1999, indicating the GM  crop 
was not profitable, then the producer will continue to find the GM  crop unprofitable in 
2000, due to the introduction of  increased price risk for the GM  crop. 
TESTABLEHYPOTHESIS  3  (TH3).  Producers whoplanted only conventional seed in 
1999 will continue to do so in 2000. 
Acceptance of this hypothesis is consistent with a producer maximizing expected 
utility, or maximizing expected profits. In contrast, if this hypothesis is rejected, it 
provides support for the hypothesis that there is no effect of price uncertainty due to the 
GM  controversy on producers' acreage allocation decisions. 
Hypotheses 1-3  predict that producers who are more risk averse are less likely to 
plant GM  crops. However, many producers planted 100% GM  soybeans in 1999. For 
producers at  this corner solution, the introduction  of a possible price penalty may or may 
not affect their acreage allocation of  GM  soybeans. Their response will depend on the 
size of the possible price penalty, their degree of risk aversion, and the magnitude of the 
production advantages of GM  soybeans relative to conventional soybeans. Nonetheless, 
if the GM  controversy has an important effect on planting decisions, no additional pro- 
ducers will move to this corner solution. 
TESTABLE  HYPOTHESIS  4 (TH4).  No producers will plant  100%  GM soybeans in 
2000 who did not do so in 1999. 
One alternative hypothesis is the possibility that respondents are risk neutral. In 
contrast to a risk-averse producer, a risk-neutral producer will always plant all acreage 
in the variety with the higher expected return in our framework. In order to differenti- 
ate between risk-averse  and risk-neutral producers as the dominant group in the sample, 
we examine whether or not producer risk attitudes, as measured by survey responses, 
are a significant explanatory factor for acreage allocation decisions. 
Econometric Model 
The producers' solution to the acreage allocation problem depends on expected returns 
from each crop, the expected price discount for GM  crops, the variance of returns from 
each crop, the land constraint, their wealth level, and their risk preferences. The 2000 
GM  share variables are truncated; there are many producers with either 0% or 100% 
GM  corn or soybeans in 2000. Hence, corn and soybean acreage allocation is modeled 
using a two-limit Tobit model, where y; is a latent variable representing the farmer's 
beliefs about the profitability of the crop, x, is a vector of independent variables which 
explain adoption, P is a vector of  unknown parameters, and E, is a disturbance term 
assumed to be independently and normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance 02,  and t = 1, ..., n,  where n is the number of  observations: Alexander, Fernandez-Cornejo, and Goodhue  Farmers' GMAcreage Allocation Decisions  587 
However, the  farmer's observed behavior is the share of corn and soybean acreage in 
GM and conventional crops, y,, which is bounded by 0  and 1: 
If the farmer believes the GM crop is not profitable, then he will not adopt it. Alter- 
natively, if the farmer believes GM corn is more profitable than the alternative crop, 
where the alternative yields profits of z, then the GM crop will be adopted. 
Based on the theoretical model, the independent variables that explain adoption 
include the expected returns associated with conventional and GM crops, the  variances 
and covariances between the conventional and GM  crops, the total number of  acres 
operated, the farmer's risk preferences, and the farmer's wealth. The farmer's wealth 
level (W) is proxied by the value of the planted acres owned by the pr~ducer.~  Farmers 
with more wealth will be less likely to shift away from GM crops. The expected returns 
for each crop will depend on the producer's ability, which increases with schooling and 
experience (Welch;  Huffman; Feder, Just, and  Zilberman). Years of schooling  is  included 
as a proxy for ability.4 Total acres (A)  are defined as total operated acres planted to 
either soybeans or corn in  2000  (Marra and Carlson). We include the  farmer's 1999 gross 
farm income as a second measure of farm size, since it captures the size of the farm's 
livestock and row crop operations. Larger operations will be less responsive to the GM 
controversy for two reasons: First, larger farms tend to be more diversified; and second, 
larger farms require more management, and GM crops tend to require less management 
effort. 
In order to examine alternative hypotheses, we also include the number of crop 
operations, and the number of livestock operations which are expected to capture both 
wealth effects in  terms of equipment and buildings, and  management effort.  Since farms 
with more operations will require more management effort, these variables are likely 
to be positively related to the share of GM crops. To capture any labor constraints that 
may influence the farmer's decision to plant GM crops, the total number of employees 
on the farm is included. We also incorporate the farmer's 1999 GM crop planting 
decisions to provide a baseline comparison for the  farmer's 2000  decisions, and to reflect 
the  farmer's personal experience with GM crops. The 1999 share of GM crops will reflect 
whether the  farmer's previous experience was positive or negative. For corn, we include 
the total number of years the farmer has planted GM corn to better capture learning 
effects and habits. 
To capture producer risk preferences (@(W)),  we include an attitudinal index of the 
farmer's willingness to take risks. Farmers who are more willing to accept risk will be 
more likely to continue to plant GM crops. The farmer's belief regarding consumer 
acceptance of biotech food products is used to represent producer beliefs about the 
The value of the planted acres is calculated using the 2000 average value of land in the producer's county multiplied by 
the number of planted acres owned by the farmer. The average value of land in Iowa counties was published in The  Des 
Moines Register (Perkins). 
Farmer age and years of experience are excluded because they are highly collinear with the years of schooling. 588  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
discount for GM crops (E[dl,  var(d)). Farmers who believe that consumers will reject 
some biotech food products will be less likely to plant GM crops. For corn, we also 
incorporate an attitudinal variable eliciting the producer's concern about yield damage 
from the European corn borer, which is expected to positively influence the planting of 
Bt corn. 
Survey Data 
Survey data were collected with the cooperation of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. 
Mail surveys were sent to a sample of  1,000  Iowa Farm Bureau members who grow corn 
and  plant at  least 100 acres of row crops. Survey recipients were randomly selected from 
within the group meeting these two conditions. The first wave of the survey was mailed 
February 9,2000, and a second copy was sent to nonrespondents on March 1,2000. The 
gross response rate was 43%. After excluding the undeliverable surveys, 389 usable 
responses were ~btained.~ 
The data set contains information on acreage allocations for both corn and soybeans. 
For corn, producers reported the acres they planted in different specialized traits for 
1997-1999,  and how many acres they intended to plant in 2000. Specialized traits 
included in the survey were Bt corn, Roundup Ready corn, Liberty Link corn, Clearfield 
(IMI) corn, high oil corn, white corn, stacked traits, and all other specialized corn. For 
soybeans, producers reported the acres they planted in different specialized traits in 
1999, and how much they intended to plant in 2000. Specialized traits for soybeans in- 
cluded in the survey were Roundup Ready, STS, and other specialized traits. Producers 
also answered questions regarding their attitudes toward risk and biotechnology,  farm 
operations, and personal demographic characteristics. 
To capture producer attitudes about the consumer response to products from biotech- 
nology and risk, we have adopted attitudinal questions developed by Barham. To elicit 
the respondent's perception of  consumer acceptance of  biotechnology food products, 
respondents were asked to strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: "Consumers will 
not accept some food products from biotechnology." In  order to reduce noise, each of the 
respondents' scores was converted to a z-score, with property of mean 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. 
To elicit their attitudes about risk, respondents were asked to strongly agree or dis- 
agree (using the same scale as above)  with the following statements: (a)  "I would rather 
take more of  a chance on making a big profit than be content with a smaller but less 
risky profit"; (b)  "I regard myself as the kind of person who is  willing to take more risks 
than the average farmer"; and (c) "Farmers who are willing to take chances usually do 
better financially." From this set of questions, we generated an index of an individual's 
willingness to accept risk. To develop the index, each of  the respondents' scores was 
converted to a z-score. Questions  with a negative correlation were reverse-scored, so that 
high scores for each question were consistent. This index had a Cronbach's alpha relia- 
bility coefficient of 0.73.6 
'  Undeliverable surveys were those for which the addressee was retired, a landlord, or deceased. 
Cronbach's alpha is a coefficient of reliability, and it depends on the number of variables and the average covariances 
between all the variables. It identifies how well a set of variables measures a single unidimensional latent construct. 
Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients above 0.60 are considered satisfactory. Alexander, Fernandez-Cornejo, and Goodhue  Farmers' GMAcreage Allocation Decisions  589 
Of course, this study's  sample may not necessarily represent all Iowa producers. Our 
cooperation with the Iowa Farm Bureau may have resulted in an attitudinal bias, 
relative to all Iowa producers. Given the American Farm Bureau Federation's (AFBF's) 
advocacy of consumer education for GM crops, the farmers in our sample are expected 
to be more accepting of GM crops relative to farmers who do not belong to the Farm 
B~reau.~  Less subjectively, the sample is deliberately biased toward producers with 
larger farms relative to the overall population of producers. Small producers were elim- 
inated (less  than 100 acres of row crops) from our sample in order to obtain a better idea 
of the factors driving total acreage allocation decisions from a sample of a given number 
of producers. Farms of  100 acres or more accounted for only 58.6% of Iowa farms, but 
accounted for 90.2% of Iowa corn production in 1997 [US. Department of Agriculture 
(USDAII . 
Most of the differences between our sample and the population of Iowa farmers, as 
measured by the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service, can be explained by 
our minimum size requirement. For instance, the survey respondents had larger gross 
farm incomes than Iowa farmers as a whole. According to Sands and Holden, 26% of 
Iowa farmers had a gross farm income of $10,000 or less in 1999, compared with 2.2% 
of our sample. For 1999, 62% of respondents had a gross farm income of $100,000 or 
more compared to 35% of Iowa farmers in 1997. In 1998, the average size of an Iowa 
farm was 340 acres (Sands and  Holden), while, among the survey respondents, the  aver- 
age farm size was 562 acres for the 2000 crop year. A larger share of respondents (84%) 
are  full-time farmers compared to the  overall population (62%),  which is consistent with 
full-time farmers operating larger farms than part-time farmers. Overall, we believe 
that the farmers in our sample-which  consists of larger farms and a higher proportion 
of full-time farmers than the average Iowa farm-are  more aware of GM crops, and are 
therefore more likely to adopt GM crops than the average Iowa farmer. 
Results 
In the empirical analysis, we first examine farmers' planting intentions for 2000. Second, 
we test the  hypotheses generated by the theoretical model regarding the impact of price 
uncertainty due to the GM controversy on producer planting decisions. 
Planting Intentions of Survey Respondents 
Overall, producers in the sample did not substantially change their planned total corn 
acreage, but they did plan to plant fewer acres to soybeans. Producers reported they 
expected to plant about 20% fewer acres of  soybeans overall (a decline from 116,007 
acres in 1999 to 92,463 acres in 2000). Respondents expected to plant only 0.5% fewer 
acres of corn (a  decline from 97,048 acres in 1999 to 97,564 in 2000). 
Respondents indicated they intended to plant 13% fewer acres of  GM  soybeans in 
2000 (a  decline from 70,252 in 1999 to 61,122 acres). Despite increased demand uncer- 
tainty for genetically altered crops, Iowa corn-soybean producers planned to increase 
'  During  the controversy, Carl Loop, the vice president of American Farm Bureau Federation, asserted that education is 
the key to consumer acceptance, and stated: "Otherwise,  no one--consumers  or farmers--will  gain the potential benefits 
offered by biotechnology"  (online at http:llwww.fb.com~newdnr/nr99/nrlll8.htm). 590  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Percentage of Acres Planted in Genetically Modified Crops: 1999 
and 2000 
Acreage % 
Description  1999  2000 
Acreage in Roundup  Ready Soybeans: 
% of total sample 
Mean for individual farmers 
Acreage in Bt Corn: 
% of total sample 
Mean for individual farmers 
Acreage in Liberty Link Corn: 
% of total sample 
Mean for individual farmers 
Acreage in Roundup  Ready Corn: 
% of total sample 
Mean for individual farmers 
their acreage share allocated to GM soybeans (table 3). Of the 389 respondents, 61.6% 
intended to make no change to their acreage allocation. More planned to increase their 
acreage share in GM  soybeans (17.8% of respondents) than to decrease (20.6%). The 
mean of each individual farmer's 2000 share of soybean acres in Roundup Ready soy- 
beans is significantly higher than the farmer's 1999 level, at  the 90% level. This 
provides statistical support for the focus group finding that production characteristics 
dominated any effect of price uncertainty for GM soybeans. 
In aggregate, respondents intended to plant 6.2% fewer acres to Bt corn in 2000 (a 
decline from 29,764 acres in 1999 to 27,905 acres in 2000). Fewer farmers planned to 
plant Bt corn in 2000 than 1999. In 1999, 60.6% of the farmers planted Bt corn. For 
2000,49.9% of the farmers intended to plant Bt corn. The mean of each individual 
farmer's share of corn acres in Bt corn is lower in 2000 relative to 1999. The decline is 
significant at  the 90% level. 
Overall, based on planting intentions for 2000, the  acreage planted to herbicide toler- 
ant  corn, including Liberty Link and Roundup Ready, was unchanged between 1999 and 
2000. Relatively few farmers in the sample planted or intended to plant herbicide 
tolerant corn; 18%  planted herbicide tolerant corn in 1999, and 13% intended to plant 
herbicide tolerant corn in 2000. There was no significant difference in the mean of each 
individual farmer's share of  corn acres in either Liberty Link or Roundup Ready corn 
between 1999 and 2000. 
Regression Analysis 
To test TH1, we use a two-limit Tobit model to regress the 2000 share of  GM soybeans 
on the 1999 share, and the 2000 share of GM corn on the 1999 share, with no constant. 
Because TH1 only applies to producers at an interior solution in 1999, the sample is 
restricted to those producers. For TH1, our null hypothesis is that producers initially 
at  an  interior solution did not reduce their GM acreage: H,:  PGMgg  2 1,  HA:  PGMgg  < 1. Our 
findings are consistent with the summary statistics presented above. Producers cer- 
tainly do not plan to reduce their GM soybean acreage, i.e., PGMgg  = 1.251>1  at  the 99% Alexander, Femandez-Comejo, and Goodhue  Farmers' GMAcreage Allocation Decisions  591 
level (the 95% confidence interval is D.066, 1,4361). These findings suggest the GM 
controversy was not the dominant factor in producers' soybean acreage allocation. In 
contrast, producers are changing their corn acreage allocation in a manner consistent 
with a response to the GM  controversy. As predicted by TH1, producers at an interior 
solution in 1999 plan to reduce their GM  corn acreage in 2000 (PGMgg  = 0.853 < 1  at  the 
99% level; the 95% confidence interval is [0.760,0.945]). 
Table 4 reports regression results regarding the determinants of 2000 planting inten- 
tions. For each crop, the dependent variable is the share of  acreage planted in GM 
varieties. The primary factor influencing 2000 planting intentions for GM crops is past 
experience with GM  crops, which reflects a farmer's habits, the amount of  information 
the farmer has about the performance of  this new technology, and personal character- 
istics such as innovativeness. For both GM  corn and GM  soybeans, the 1999 acreage 
share explains a large portion of 2000 planting intentions. Further, the strong  predictive 
power of  the 1999 acreage share suggests farmers may be near the diffusion ceiling, as 
hypothesized  by Fernandez-Cornejo, Daberkow, and McBride. For GM corn, the number 
of years the farmer had planted GM corn was positively and significantly  related to 2000 
planting intentions for the full sample only. 
For GM  corn, the 2000 share is also explained by  attitudes and farm size. Farmers 
who are concerned about yield damage from ECB are significantly  more likely to plant 
more GM  corn (at  the 99%  level). Consistent with the focus group finding indicating the 
planting of GM corn is  influenced by the controversy surrounding GM crops, agreement 
with the statement that some consumers will not accept biotech food products had a 
negative effect on the 2000 share.' However, in contrast to our prediction that farmers' 
risk preferences would influence their reaction to the controversy, their willingness to 
accept risk does not explain the 2000 share of GM corn. This finding suggests either that 
farmers are  risk neutral, or that  the presence of production and other risks obscures the 
relationship between risk attitudes and the GM  controversy, or  that the group of 
questions about the farmer's willingness to accept risk is a poor measure of the farmer's 
riskpreferences. Wealth does not significantly influence the 2000 share of GM corn, but 
farm size and composition does. Farms with a larger gross farm income, a larger number 
of  crop operations, and a smaller number of livestock operations were significantly  more 
likely to plant a larger share of  GM corn. Based on the implications of these findings, 
farms with a large number of  crop activities, where corn and soybeans constitute a 
relatively small share of  the income, are more likely to plant GM  crops which require 
less management effort. 
For GM soybeans,  the 2000 share is primarily explained by previous experience with 
GM soybeans. The 1999 gross farm income is positively related to the adoption of  GM 
soybeans. For the full sample, farmers with more years of  schooling were significantly 
more likely to plant a smaller share of GM  soybeans in 2000. Consistent with Fernandez- 
Cornejo and McBride (pp. 16-18), we find that the adoption of  GM soybeans is invariant 
to farm acreage. Fernandez-Cornejo, Daberkow, and McBride attribute this finding to the 
'  Further support for the influence of the controversy on the GM  corn planting decision is found when we compare the 
regression  of the 2000 share of GM  corn on the explanatory  variables excludingthe 1999 share, and the regression  of the 1999 
share of GM  corn on the explanatory variables. Notably, the farmer's belief about consumer acceptance of biotech foods has 
a negative and significant  effect on the 2000 share and no effect on the 1999 share. The index related to the farmer's willing- 
ness to accept risk has no effect on the 2000 share or the 1999 share of GM  corn. The same set of regressions was  also 
performed for GM  soybeans,  with findings showing both the 1999 and 2000 shares were invariant to the farmer's willingness 
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Table 4. Tobit Regressions on 2000 GM Acreage Share: Farmers at the Interior 
in 1999, and Full Sample 
Subsample: 
Interior in 1999  Full Sample 
2000 Share  2000 Share  2000 Share  2000 Share 
Description  GM  Corn  GM Soybeans  GM  Corn  GM Soybeans 
Share of GM corn 1999 
Share of GM  soybeans 1999 
Total corn acreage 2000 (100s) 
Total soybean acreage 2000 (100s) 
Years planting GM corn 
Farmer agrees is willing to take risks 
Consumers will not accept biotech food products 
Concern about yield damage fiom ECB 
1999 gross farm income ($100,000~) 
Value of farmland ($100,000~) 
Number of livestock operations 
Number of crop operations 
Years of school 
Number of employees 
Constant 
Number of observations 
Pseudo R2 
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*)denote signi6cance  at 90%, 95%,  and 99%, respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics. 
degree of  adoption of GM soybeans; the adoption of GM soybeans is beyond the inno- 
vator and early adopter stages which are the most sensitive to farm size. As expected, 
risk preferences, as measured by the risk index, do not explain the share of  GM  soy- 
beans. In addition, the farmer's wealth level does not explain the 2000 share of  GM 
soybeans. 
As predicted in TH2, there will be a positive relationship between the change in share 
of corn and soybeans in GM acreage for 1999 and 2000, provided farmers' risk prefer- 
ences are  independent of the crop. For a risk-neutral producer, an  inability to reject TH2 
would suggest the expected GM  price discount is positively correlated across crops. 
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corn and soybeans would be consistent with our findings that producers had a different 
acreage response to the  controversy for GM corn and GM soybeans, due to their different 
production characteristics. 
For the full sample, the relationship between the  percentage change in GM corn and 
percentage change in GM soybeans is positive, but insignificant (P = 0.066). For farmers 
at  an interior solution in 1999 for both GM corn and GM soybeans, a positive and 
weakly significant relationship is observed at the 90% level in the acreage responses 
(p = 0.192). There is no relationship between the change in share of GM corn and GM 
soybeans between 1999 and 2000. Overall, this result implies either our assumption 
that farmers' risk preferences are independent of the crop is incorrect, or farmers have 
heterogeneous expectations regarding GM price discounts for corn and soybeans. 
As stated  in TH3, producers who planted only conventional seed in 1999 are  predicted 
to continue to plant only conventional seed in 2000. While most producers who were 
conventional only in 1999  behaved as  predicted, a number of producers decided to plant 
GM soybeans or GM corn in 2000. Therefore, we reject TH3 for both corn and soybeans. 
For soybeans, of the 71  producers who planted 100%  conventional in 1999,16 chose to 
plant at  least some GM soybeans in 2000. Of the 108  producers who planted 100% con- 
ventional corn in 1999, 13  elected to plant at least some GM corn in 2000. 
TH4 predicts, given the price risk associated with GM crops in 2000, no more pro- 
ducers will plant 100% GM in 2000 than in 1999. We reject TH4 for both corn and 
soybeans. Of the 187 soybean producers who planted less than 100% GM in 1999,38 
decided to plant 100%  GM soybeans in 2000. For corn, of the 304 producers who planted 
less than 100%  GM in 1999, six chose to plant 100%  GM corn in 2000. These rejections 
reveal that price risk due to the GM controversy is  not the primary consideration influ- 
encing producer acreage allocation decisions. 
Conclusion 
This study examines the importance of the GM controversy for Iowa corn-soybean 
farmer acreage allocation decisions, using a model of a risk-averse producer's utility of 
profits. One possible outcome of the controversy  is that producers will face a price penalty 
on GM crops. Hence, decisions are examined in the presence and absence of price risk 
to represent producers' spring 2000, and spring 1999 planting decisions, respectively. 
We test our model using data collected from a survey of Iowa Farm Bureau members 
who plant at least 100 acres of row crops. While the survey sample does not include 
small farmers, it is reasonably representative of  the producers responsible for the 
majority of corn production in Iowa. In the absence of the  focus group data  on producers' 
beliefs about GM crops,  risk-averse producers would be predicted to reduce their acreage 
in all GM crops as a result of the  increased demand uncertainty in spring 2000 relative 
to spring 1999. However, given producers' comments regarding the significant produc- 
tion benefits of GM soybeans, we instead predicted that producers may increase their 
acreage in GM soybeans. Survey results confirm that producers plan to decrease their 
acreage in GM corn and increase their acreage in GM soybeans. These findings empha- 
size the  importance of considering  all characteristics of alternative crops when examining 
the potential effects of a demand shock. 
Our analysis of the factors affecting producers' 2000 acreage allocation decisions was 
inconclusive with respect to the  role of farmers' risk preferences. These risk preferences, 594  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
as measured by an index of farmers' responses to questions about their willingness to 
accept risk, did not explain their 2000 planting decisions. This finding may suggest that 
farmers are  risk neutral, assuming the  index accurately captures their risk preferences. 
Alternatively, this finding may be due to the inaccurate measurement of risk preferences 
by the index. This ambiguity demonstrates a need for further research on measuring 
risk preferences, and on the influence of risk preferences on farmers' acreage allocation 
decisions. 
One factor which will undoubtedly affect acreage allocations in the future is prem- 
iums for non-GM varieties. While premiums are  increasing for some local markets, such 
as  non-GM soybeans in Indiana,  the future and size of these premiums is  uncertain. The 
European Union is considering revising its GM  tolerance levels. Many developing 
countries have not determined their GM foodstuffs policies. The market for non-GM 
crops is still evolving, and will be partially determined by such policy decisions. 
Consumers' attitudes toward GM foods will also determine the market for non-GM 
crops. First, price premiums at  the  farmgate require final consumers who will pay more 
for non-GM foods. Second, perceived consumer reluctance to accept some GM  foods 
reduced survey respondents' acreage allocation decisions in our analysis, even without 
any known price premiums (or evidence that risk attitudes affected acreage allocation). 
Any future changes in consumer attitudes may directly affect acreage allocations as 
well. Farmers' use of consumer attitudes  in their production decisions, even in the 
absence of direct price signals, is  likely to become more important as  consumers become 
increasingly concerned about the manner in which their food is produced. 
[Received September 2002;final revision received September 2003.1 
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